A key is how one machine signs in. Request only the capabilities that machine needs. A super-admin reviews the application; approval does not email or create a credential. After approval, sign in here to issue it and reveal the token once.

Some calls cannot be taken back by running the agent again. The ones ticked below wait for a person before they run. They start ticked; untick only what you are content to let your own grants run without asking. You can change this later under Access.

Send one record with the key. The first record has sequence 0 and no previous hash. Every later one names the hash of the record before it, which is what makes the order checkable. The snippets above are ready to paste once a key exists.

The fields, explained: Quickstart

A signature says the bytes did not change. The order check asks a different question: does each sealed block still follow the one before it. Run it here, and again whenever someone asks.

A repeat call is one the gate recognised as already answered. This counts how often that happened, not what it saved.

A signature says the bytes did not change. It does not say the record is still in the place it was written. That is a separate question, and this is where it gets asked.

A local harness exports two kinds of record: an intent envelope, and a checkpoint from a human pause. Paste one here with the signer's public key. The service runs the same signature arithmetic you can run offline, so the two answers can be compared. Nothing pasted here is stored.

This is the same question an orchestrator asks before it starts a child agent. Ask it here to see the answer the gate would give.

A grant lets one named agent use named tools until it ends. Give it a parent when one agent is handing work to another: the child can never hold more than its parent, and the service refuses a grant that tries.

Revoke withdraws one grant. What is reported below is the state the grant list carries when it is read back after the call, not the answer the call gave.

A refused sub-agent can park in a recorded wait while its delegation chain is asked in order, parent first, ending with you. Resolve a wait here or leave it: silence is not approval, and an unanswered wait resolves as a refusal when its deadline passes.

A PIC continuation token is evidence that one agent's authority descends from its delegator without widening. Paste a settled token: the gate answers first, then the pic engine checks it against the realm key configured on this service. The mode below is the mode of the check being run, not a stored setting -- advisory warns and leaves the decision alone, required turns an unevaluable token into an ask that waits on a person. Nothing pasted here is stored by this panel.

Every check your integrations ran against a grant, oldest first, each signed by the service key named beside it. Fetch the published key from /v1/delegations/service-pubkeys and you can verify any of them without asking us.

For each capability (or tool), the share of refused calls in the last complete week against the week before. A change is listed only when it is larger than chance explains, and a week with fewer than 100 decisions is never compared. It is a reading of recorded decisions, not a verdict about any agent; check the policy versions first.

One machine hands another a scoped, time-bound right to record one task. The grant and each use are written into the chain, so the hand-off can be shown in order to a third party.

Every delegation token carries a signature from this identity. Verification runs on your machine with this key; nothing here has to be online for it. Pin the value when an evaluation starts. A changed key is a changed service identity.

A change to what agents may do is proposed, ratified, then enacted, and each step is a record with its own author. Nothing takes effect at the proposal.

The ticked actions wait for a person before they run. Changing this list needs a signed-in person; an API key cannot change it. Every change is recorded on later decisions and sends a notice in the app and by email.

One key per machine, so revoking one does not stop the others. Submit a scoped application first. A super-admin may narrow it. Once approved, issue it here; the token is revealed once in this authenticated console and is never sent by email.

When outbound webhooks are enabled, one URL per account can receive warnings marked for the webhook channel as signed JSON. Only HTTPS destinations that resolve entirely to public address space are accepted. The endpoint signing secret is revealed once when you save it. A disabled deployment queues and sends nothing.

Checking a delivery

1. Read the raw request body before parsing it.
2. Read X-AFA-Timestamp, X-AFA-Delivery-ID, and X-AFA-Signature.
3. Recompute HMAC-SHA256 over timestamp.delivery-id.raw-body with the one-time secret.
4. Compare the two values in constant time.
5. Reject on mismatch. Treat a missing header as a failed check.

The recipe with code: Webhooks

Accepting a live invitation grants the role but does not create an administrator session. Return through the separate step-up page for short-lived access.

A row marked mandatory cannot be turned off. Email dispatch state is reported independently. Webhook dispatch runs only when the deployment's outbound gate is enabled; each configured endpoint receives its own one-time signing secret so the receiver can verify raw-body authenticity.

This walkthrough is simulation-only. It uses canned answers in the browser, sends nothing, and cannot create, spend, or revoke a real grant. Run again starts a fresh simulation. Stop finishes the current simulated step and discards its local state.